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3SUMMARY
This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is
mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security
policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would
place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with
European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it
well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of
American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in
Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.

5INTRODUCTION
In late 2011, the Obama Administration announced a ‘pivot’ to Asia. This announce-
ment followed shortly after Washington’s unexpectedly limited participation in
NATO’s Libya campaign. Thereafter, senior US officials repeatedly emphasized in
their public statements America’s need to prioritize its relationship with Asia. In
Europe, a belief emerged that the Administration’s rhetoric constituted a major new
development in US policy and would actually place meaningful restrictions on
America’s willingness and capability to deal with European security problems. This
belief has now become dogma, and its institutionalization is evident in the
mainstream political, bureaucratic and expert discourse. Moreover, the ‘pivot’ was
not only accepted as a fact in its own right, but it became the prism through which
US foreign policy behaviour has been viewed more generally. Unfortunately, as is the
case with most accepted wisdom, it is rarely challenged, despite the existence of
considerable evidence and credible alternative interpretations that would call it into
question. This paper will argue that in contrast to the mainstream interpretation, the
Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mostly a rhetorical construct that has very little
meaning for US security policy, and it has served to mislead analysts trying to under-
stand that policy.
Typically, in the aftermath of a government announcement of a new or enhanced
focus on a particular issue, there are two responses on the part of the bureaucracy.
The first response is that the rhetoric is viewed simply as rhetoric and no action is
taken other than to repeat the rhetoric, possibly to include the relabeling of current
activities and institutions. The second response involves slight adjustments to the
bureaucracy beyond mere relabeling, such as providing more funding, setting up a
new office within the existing structure, appointing a senior official to be responsible
for that issue, and increasing the number of personnel dealing with it. Often it will be
the case that the choice of response is directly correlated to the amount of funding
that is to be dedicated to the issue. In those instances where little or no additional
funding is involved, the political rhetoric is unlikely to be institutionalized from a
bureaucratic perspective. On the other hand, when considerable amounts of funding
are allocated, bureaucratic interest in the matter increases remarkably. And as
bureaucratic interest increases, fostering a need to acquire expertise on an issue, a
cottage industry of outside analysts will also miraculously appear, thereby creating a
self-sustaining interest in keeping the issue alive. But regardless of which response is
adopted, the impact bureaucratic institutionalization has for the issues themselves
remains relatively uniform. Following the initial increase in activity and sense of
urgency, especially on the part of senior officials, interest in the issue gradually fades.
This is because the issue will often get overtaken by other events whilst the reality of
the grinding and debilitating nature of bureaucratic routine makes itself felt, particu-
AMERICA’S GLOBAL DEFENCE PREDICAMENT
6
larly as lower-level officials have to deal with the practical problems and minutiae
inherent in trying to operationalize vague political guidance into workable programs.
Since it was first announced, the Asia ‘pivot’ has essentially followed this course. At
best, or worst, depending on one’s point of view, the actual substance of Obama’s
policy has amounted to little more than raising the profile of Asia in terms of political
and bureaucratic interest, relative to any number of other issues regularly dealt with
by policymakers. Its most visible component consists of the numerous speeches and
media commentary of senior officials that emphasize America’s ‘enduring commit-
ment to this critical region’. There has also been a marginal increase in the number
of high-level visits to Asia compared with earlier administrations, as well as minor
adjustments in the US force posture and funding priorities. This amount of substance
is unlikely to increase in the near-term due to attention and resources being focused
on so many other international crises.
Of perhaps greater significance than these limited US actions are the perceptions, or
as argued here, the misperceptions, of other governments with respect to what they
believe the rebalancing means for them, and the anxiety this has caused. Many
Europeans remain wedded to the Obama Administration’s original rhetoric on the
subject, and to the idea that the ‘pivot’ is to blame for what is perceived to be
American disinterest in its security affairs. To some extent this belief has been delib-
erately fostered by European leaders in order to make the case for increasing invest-
ment in European defence and greater strategic autonomy, particularly in Europe’s
immediate neighbourhood. According to this argument, America’s focus on Asia
means that Europeans must become more self-reliant. Similarly, many Asian
countries have also taken Obama’s words at face value, and are now viewing US
commitment to the region through the prism of the ‘pivot’. Ironically, this has
become increasingly problematic for Washington as it cannot meet the unrealistic
expectations which have been inadvertently created as a result of its own rhetoric.
At the end of the day actions tend to speak louder than words, and as with any
rhetorical trend that is devoid of substantive value, it will gradually lose its appeal,
though this may be a long drawn out process. In the meantime, it will remain impor-
tant as a frame for discussing and interpreting US policy, and for the actions that
follow from this. Interestingly, since it was first announced, the tone of the American
rhetoric has been lowered somewhat, providing an additional indicator that the
Obama Administration has sought to dampen its earlier enthusiasm. When it was
initially discussed, the word used was ‘pivot’, and to a large extent this term
continues to be used, despite the fact that US policy was quickly rebranded as ‘rebal-
ancing’. In terms of its connotations, ‘pivot’ was deemed too strong a word,
suggesting a major new commitment to Asia that would detract from commitments
in other regions. By contrast, ‘rebalancing’ had less dramatic impact. Additionally,
whereas the military dimension of the ‘pivot’ was often highlighted in official state-
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ments, at least initially, there has been an increasing emphasis on its diplomatic and
economic dimensions.
Irrespective of the precise terminology or the amount of rhetoric employed to
describe it, the military substance of the Obama Administration’s policy never
amounted to more than a small increase over existing commitments in the region,
nor is there any evidence that this policy has inhibited the US armed forces from
conducting operations elsewhere. To the extent Washington has refrained from
certain actions the reasons for this have more to do with the changing character of
American power projection. Unless this broader context is understood, Obama’s Asia
policy will continue to receive more credit than it is due, whilst more important
factors driving US policy will be overlooked. Therefore, this paper is not principally
focused on evaluating the Asia ‘rebalancing’ for its own sake. Instead, it seeks to
analyse the global predicament of American defence policy, and in so doing, demon-
strate the relative insignificance of the ‘rebalancing’ in relation to current and future
US military interventions. Four key themes will be covered. The paper will begin with
a short discussion about the importance of recognizing the trendiness of contempo-
rary US defence policy. Second, it will question the conceptual value of a strategic or
regional shift as applied to a policy outlook dominated by short-termism and a
military system designed for global power projection. Third, it will discuss the
reasons why US military intervention in Asia is highly unlikely and therefore will not
take precedence over operations elsewhere. Finally, it will examine several impor-
tant assumptions, drivers, and structural limitations of recent interventions that will
almost certainly underpin future US defence policy as well. Although diplomacy and
economics are both important features of the Administration’s ‘rebalancing’ policy,
they will not be the focus here, largely because the military component is the most
controversial aspect of the policy and has greater relevance for contemporary
security debates, especially in Europe.
Jeffrey H. Michaels
Visiting Research Fellow, Egmont Institute
Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

9ON TRENDINESS IN US DEFENCE POLICY
To understand US defence policy, it is essential to distinguish between that which is
trendy and that which is considered the norm. It is also necessary to distinguish that
which is the norm but presented as though it were trendy. And at the same time it
must be recognized that it is a norm in the defence community to be trendy.
Reinventing the wheel and the relabeling of old concepts are both common
practices. So too is the practice of elevating challenges to threats, and of relabeling
old challenges as new threats. Within the US military, crises often create a demand
which can then lead to a trend. For example, after 9/11, the US military focused
enormous resources on ‘counter-terrorism’, and after the Iraq ‘insurgency’ began in
2003, ‘counter-insurgency’ became the prominent theme. Neither of these issues
was new to the US military, but such was the sense of crisis at the time that their
importance was elevated relative to other defence priorities, funds were allocated
for research, doctrine was rewritten, justifications for weapons procurement shifted
accordingly, and both individuals and bureaucracies jumped on the bandwagon.
After ‘counterinsurgency’, or at least the large-scale version of it as practiced in Iraq
and Afghanistan was recognized as unsustainable and less than ‘successful’, the
concept has quietly disappeared from the mainstream defence discourse. As of 2014,
‘counterinsurgency’ is no longer trendy; indeed it is increasingly viewed as a dirty
word. Consequently, funding has diminished, it became a career dead-end, and
ambitious officers and scholars quietly abandoned a subject that was ‘all the rage’
several years earlier.
The problem with so many of these types of trends, and the language in which they
are couched, is that they distort objective analysis of the issues themselves. During
the 1990s, the US military was said to be undergoing a ‘revolution in military affairs’,
which by the 2000s had become a ‘transformation’. This sort of language was a far
cry from more traditional notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘reform’, particularly as
these less emotive terms suggested ‘evolution’ rather than ‘revolution’. Once the
terminology of ‘revolution’ and ‘transformation’ was adopted, reproduced in the
expert discourse, and subsequently legitimized and institutionalized, it served to
mislead many observers into thinking that more radical shifts were occurring than
was actually the case. In point of fact, most of the significant conceptual and techno-
logical developments that occurred in the US military since the end of the Cold War
merely reflected the evolution of intellectual, technological and structural develop-
ments that had been underway much earlier.
It is possible to identify many of these trends, and to recognize how many of the
concepts that are currently popular have existed for quite some time, even if they
have not always received as much attention. In the late 2000s, the term ‘cyberwar’
became quite popular, yet substantively there is little difference from ‘information
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warfare’, which was the term used in the 1990s. Throughout the post-Cold War
period many terms became trendy, such as ‘military operations other than war’,
‘network centric warfare’, ‘hybrid warfare’, despite the longstanding nature of the
issues they were addressing. The highly touted ‘Air-Sea Battle’ concept, often associ-
ated with the Asia ‘rebalancing’, also bears a remarkable resemblance to much older
efforts to increase interoperability, or ‘jointness’, among the individual services.
Though there is little that is substantively new to any of these concepts, they are
often presented as though they are new and exciting, whereas the only thing that is
new is not the concept but the label.
All military concepts represent a constituency that exists within the defence struc-
ture, be it an individual service, a branch of that service, or a particular platform, and
all have reinvented themselves in one guise or other, yet this reinvention actually
reflects the evolution of old structures and institutions in the context of changing
political priorities and technological developments. Thus it was that in the 1980s
attack submarines were justified as a means of countering the Soviet Union. A
decade later, procurement of this same platform was justified as being necessary for
countering a rising Chinese Navy. In the 2000s, the justification had switched again,
so that attack submarines were the US Navy’s premier ‘counter-terrorism’ tool. And
in the 2010’s attack submarines are increasingly refocused once again on the ‘China
threat’. Justifications may come and go but the evolution of the institutions and
technology continues regardless.
Unfortunately, both the institutions themselves, and the analysts that observe them,
typically become absorbed in the changing justifications rather than focusing on the
continuities. Hardly any attention at all is placed on the standing military tasks and
commitments that remain in the background rather than the forefront. It must also
be recognized that procurement of any major new piece of equipment occurs over a
decades-long timeline during which crises come and go. Rarely are new systems
scrapped. They may evolve technologically, more or fewer may be purchased, and
the justifications may change given the types of security challenges that emerge, but
the systems themselves are still procured, often because it is impossible to stop the
procurement process once it has started.
When Obama came into office in 2009, he was quite keen to reduce the policy
emphasis on ‘counter-terrorism’ that he inherited from Bush, and the ‘Global War on
Terrorism’ was quickly rebranded as ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’. Apart from
the rebranding, his ability to substantively reduce the ‘counter-terrorism’ policy
priority was significantly hamstrung by his decision to increase the US military role in
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in contrast to Bush’s almost exclusive focus on
‘terrorism’, a policy opening emerged under Obama in which policymakers and
bureaucrats increasingly engaged with the question of what role the US military
would play after the eventual withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Within the US military, the reason why Obama’s Asia ‘rebalancing’ became trendy
and was actively supported had more to do with bureaucratic opportunism, rather
than reflecting some newfound strategic concern about US security interests in that
region. One of the unintended consequences of the large-scale US military opera-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan was the perceived diminution of the importance of the
Navy and Air Force relative to the Army and Marine Corps. After years of relative
neglect, and amidst a more conducive political atmosphere under Obama, the Navy
and Air Force, as well as the US Pacific Command more generally, were better able
to promote the ‘China threat’ and their potential role in countering it. This is not to
say that the Chinese military build-up in recent years, as well as Beijing’s aggressive
behaviour and rhetoric, did not provide a legitimate concern for US policymakers.
Clearly there were legitimate security concerns. Nevertheless, the timing of the US
‘rebalancing’ and the highly publicized ‘Air-Sea Battle’ concept suggest that these
security concerns were of less relevance than political convenience and bureaucratic
opportunism.
Amidst the threat of budget cuts, both the Navy and Air Force have used the Asia
‘rebalancing’ as a means to secure themselves from significant funding cuts. This
opportunism is also reflected in the efforts of both the Army and Marine Corps to
create a role for themselves in conflict scenarios involving Asia due to the fear they
will be marginalized if they are unable to. For these two services, the projected
withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan threatened to leave them with a less substan-
tial role to play, and this fear was substantiated with the budget and personnel cuts
that hit the Army and Marines the hardest in the last couple of years. Being associ-
ated with the ‘rebalancing’, however remotely, became viewed as a means to be
ring-fenced from future cuts. To this end, the Army has recently rediscovered its role
as a coastal defence force, and is exploring other opportunities to demonstrate its
relevance in Asia scenarios.
A similar trendiness can be observed with respect to threat prioritization and the
means adopted to deal with threats. For instance, before 9/11, counter-terrorism
was not a new role for the US military, though it was one that was handled mainly by
the Special Forces community rather than the mainstream military. If one goes back
to the late 1990s, the US defence discourse was heavily focused on China as a rising
peer competitor that would seek to deny American access to the region. However,
after 9/11, counter-terrorism became the top priority and the ‘China threat’ receded
despite the Chinese military growing that much more powerful during this period.
This is not to say the ‘China threat’ went away completely in the list of US priorities.
It remained as background music relative to the terrorism problem and was bound
to reappear once the terrorism problem itself inevitably receded as a priority.
To some extent, one could say that the ‘China threat’ had a brief revival after
Obama’s ‘pivot’ announcement, but amidst so many other international crises, it is
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receding into the background yet again. Although there may have been the expecta-
tion several years ago of a post-Afghanistan ‘peace dividend’, in which the US armed
forces would not be involved in any new major conflicts, could marginalize its
remaining ‘war on terrorism’ commitments, and focus its main attention on the rise
of China, this expectation never materialized. One must therefore view the recogni-
tion of China as a top priority threat not as something new but as something that is
trendy at a particular moment in time. When the moment is ripe, the ‘China threat’
will no doubt become trendy again. In the meantime, when the moment is not ripe,
it becomes just another security challenge. Indeed, many other standing military
tasks all over the world continue to be carried out, even if they receive little atten-
tion, but the reasons why they occur at all usually has to do with a problem that once
had a higher priority, was subsequently downgraded, but did not go away. The US
‘War on Drugs’ is one example of this. In the early 1990s, drugs were considered
more of a threat than terrorism. Since then, military efforts to stem the drug trade
have continued, but they receive little attention. That they receive little attention has
less to do with any success they have had in countering drug trafficking, than it does
that other problems gained a higher priority.
One final type of trendiness that is relevant to this discussion can be observed in the
US relationship with its friends. In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, US Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously referred to ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’. This
rhetoric became famous because of the precise circumstances in which it was
uttered, but as a serious analytical construct it left much to be desired. In this specific
instance, ‘old Europe’ referred principally to the opposition of France and Germany
over US plans to topple Saddam Hussein. In contrast, ‘new Europe’ referred to
countries in Central and Eastern Europe who were more supportive of these plans,
though presumably it also included the United Kingdom and Spain. That US relations
with ‘old Europe’ temporarily came under strain reflected a basic problem of
American foreign policy though this case was generally treated as somehow being
exceptional. For the US, foreign countries it does not overtly class as adversaries can
be ‘in fashion’, ‘out of fashion’, or simply ‘irrelevant’, and diplomatic, trade, military
and intelligence relationships will continue to function regardless. Thus, even if a
conflict arises on a single issue, there will usually still be fairly good cooperation on a
dozen other issues. Such is the nature of international relations that disagreements
often occur even among the best of friends. The history of America’s relations with
many of its closest ‘friends’ provide ample cases in which US leaders have treated
these countries with outright contempt, disrespect, and ingratitude for services
rendered. For instance, despite its significant role in the Iraq and Afghan wars, the
United Kingdom has received little recognition or reward for its efforts. To the extent
its military contributions have translated into political influence in Washington it
might not have bothered participating at all.
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For many countries, trying to deepen relations with the US is somewhat akin to the
proverbial bank that lends you an umbrella when it is sunny and then asks for it back
when it rains. In many respects, the degree to which countries become ‘in fashion’,
‘out of fashion’, or ‘irrelevant’ has to do with what it is considered expedient in
Washington at a particular moment, rather than reflecting the bonds that are built
up as a result of years or decades of attempts to foster closer relations. The close
military relations the US and France currently maintain, which would have been
unthinkable a decade ago, provide merely one illustration of this phenomenon.
American policymakers also recognize, though they are not keen to admit it, that
European countries provide their main external source of power projection capabil-
ities. When these policymakers contemplate significant military interventions, as
they did with Syria in 2013, they first turn to Europe, rather than Asia, for support.
Despite declining European defence budgets and capabilities, this unconscious reflex
is likely to continue for the simple reason that the US has nowhere else to turn.
Paradoxically, the US remains unwilling to deal with Europeans on a quid pro quo
basis. European support for American security priorities will not automatically trans-
late into American support for European priorities. The limited US role in both the
Libya and Ukraine crises provide important evidence of this. In Washington, policy-
makers’ memories are very short indeed, and whatever lip service is paid about its
desire to ‘return favours’ is rarely translated into action on those rainy days when
American support is needed.

15
THE GLOBAL PREDICAMENT
One aspect of Obama’s ‘rebalancing’ that has received extensive commentary is the
lack of attention the President and other senior officials have been able to commit to
it given their preoccupation with other crises. Much of this commentary presupposes
that the Administration’s fixation on other crises represents an anomaly in the sense
that American leaders are normally capable of focusing on and prioritizing particular
issues for an extended period of time. Put another way, it is believed that in the
absence of having to react to constant crises, the Obama Administration would
devote considerably more attention to Asia. Such a view reflects an idealized rather
than a realistic notion of US foreign policy. In practice, US leaders are simply unable
to retain a long-term focus on any foreign policy issue, and are constantly reacting to
the ‘crisis du jour’.
Promoting a stable and prosperous Asia has been standard American policy for a very
long time, even if the means to achieve this have naturally varied depending on the
circumstances. Indeed, attempting to evaluate the significance and sense of urgency
regarding the ‘rebalancing’ is made all the more difficult because there is so little
new about it in substantive policy terms despite all the alarmist ‘China threat’
rhetoric about why it was required in the first place. Within the US defence commu-
nity, the implications of China’s rise are often discussed in a zero-sum fashion. Fears
of China removing US influence from the region, or that the US will no longer remain
a Pacific power, are typically heard and used as justification for a demonstration of
America’s ‘enduring commitment’. Apart from such a zero-sum attitude reflecting a
highly oversimplified, if not outright misleading prognosis, the nature of the
suggested remedy also leaves much to be desired.
Not only has the US been a major player in Asian affairs throughout the last century,
but its diplomatic and military presence, as well as its economic interconnectedness
with the region, have long been firmly established, and are not set to suddenly
change due to China’s rise. Therefore, how much more of an enduring commitment
can the US presumably make to ensure it remains a powerful Asian player? Is the US
supposed to be giving more aid, keeping more troops, ships and planes in Asia,
increasing the number of diplomats, and/or doing more business? As official
announcements indicate, all of the above is considered necessary if the US is to
remain a Pacific power, and to enjoy the benefits deriving from the ‘Pacific Century’.
But is this about simply doing more of what the US has always been up to in the
region anyway, or is there something qualitatively different about the ‘rebalancing’?
Moreover, is there any precedent for what this sort of strategic shift amounts to in
practice, and what it means for US policy in other regions?
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During the Second World War, it might have been possible to understand the notion
of a regional strategic emphasis in which the European theatre had a higher priority
than the Pacific in terms of the resources the US allocated to it, but it would be
impossible to argue that the region was ever ignored. Likewise, throughout the Cold
War, the US was intimately involved in Asian affairs in its effort to stop what it
perceived to be the ‘menace’ of Communism. Yet at the same time it was intimately
involved diplomatically, militarily and economically in Europe, the Middle East, Africa
and Latin America. The amount of resources devoted to a particular region may have
increased or decreased depending on the time period and the nature of the crises
that were being faced, but these shifts were rarely dramatic. Even during the
Vietnam War, when significant attention and resources were devoted to Southeast
Asia, often at the expense of other areas of the world, these additional commitments
were always viewed as temporary, with the balance to be restored once hostilities
concluded. In any event, the Vietnam commitment was always seen as an addition
to a global Cold War burden that was ongoing throughout the period, but may not
have grabbed nearly so much media spotlight.
In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration wrestled with the problem of increasing
US security commitments to the Persian Gulf, eventually to be enunciated as the
Carter Doctrine. It is notable that despite all the attention this Doctrine received, at
least from a rhetorical point of view, there was very little substantive change to US
policy towards the region. From a military perspective, the US Central Command
would later be set-up, albeit in many respects this new institution merely demon-
strated a higher level of interest in a region that the US military had already been
involved with for decades anyway. By the same token, the creation of US Africa
Command at the end of the Bush Administration might have been viewed as a new
commitment to African affairs, though in practice it simply created a new bureau-
cracy headed by a four-star general to take charge of the US military’s pre-existing
activities on that continent, which then gave these activities a higher profile.
Revealingly, unlike in Western Europe or East Asia, the US military has not
maintained a large forward presence in the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. In
the event of a serious conflict erupting, US military forces can be transferred to these
regions, either from its other overseas bases in the event of small crises, or directly
from the US itself if the conflict were a large one. One of the key problems of so much
of the current discourse about the reduction of the American military presence in
Europe is that it fundamentally misreads the way the US conceptualizes power
projection. For American planners, especially after the Cold War, the utility of
maintaining a significant forward presence in Europe was not considered as essential
as being able to use European facilities, especially air bases and ports, to project
power elsewhere. Unfortunately, most analysts who focus on these issues examine
the eye-catching headlines that refer to US troop withdrawals, whereas more time
spent studying America’s global system for providing logistical support to its
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deployed forces, such as the US Transportation Command’s ‘En Route System’ and
its prepositioned supply bases, would place these moves into a much different and
less dramatic perspective.
Serious analytical shortcomings are also apparent in relation to the military aspects
of Obama’s Asia ‘rebalancing’. Its key component is the stationing of a greater
percentage of US naval vessels in the Pacific than in the Atlantic (from 50-50 to 60-
40). Though not widely discussed, this shift of naval assets was for the most part
previously enunciated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which stipulated
that the US Navy would maintain at least 6 carriers (and presumably all the support
vessels that compose a carrier strike group) and 60 percent of its submarines in the
Pacific. The other military components associated with the ‘rebalancing’ are the
stationing of several thousand US Marines in Australia, an increasing number of port
visits to Singapore, and bolstering the US military presence in Guam. Omitted from
the discussion of the ‘rebalancing’ is the ongoing drawdown and relocation of some
9,000 US Marines stationed in Okinawa due to local pressure. Thus, in purely numer-
ical terms, there is a redistribution of mainly existing forces, partially out of necessity,
rather than any significant increase of new forces as might otherwise be surmised
from official statements.
In theory, this redistribution of naval assets would serve to increase the US deterrent
capability in the region, as well as enhance the speed and flexibility with which US
leaders could deploy their forces. The military logic for moving these assets is that in
the event of a significant conflict breaking out, the sailing time to the region for a
larger number of Navy vessels would be reduced by a matter of days if not weeks. In
the absence of a conflict in Asia that would require their presence, these ships and
troops would be available to be deployed elsewhere. However, there is no historical
precedent, at least none in recent memory, in which large numbers of Navy vessels
have not been deployed at any one time, and therefore are not readily at hand to
execute a pre-existing contingency plan. Crucially, as with all military plans and
scenarios involving rapid response to a major crisis, there is quite a wide gap
between the ideal and the actual.
If history is any guide, there is usually a considerable time lag after a crisis begins
before a political decision is even made to commit military forces in the first place.
Thus, the problems of force readiness and proximity to the conflict zone, whilst
important, are always secondary to the political decision-making. Furthermore, in
some scenarios involving a conflict on the Korean peninsula, the need to commit
hundreds of thousands of US military personnel is one that would take many months
to assemble from forces based all over the world. In other words, for large-scale
operations, leaving aside the political considerations and focusing purely on military-
technical matters, maintaining a forward presence is mostly irrelevant, because such
is the slow nature of military mobilization and deployment that the notion of a ‘rapid
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response’ is not technically feasible under such circumstances. The 1991 and 2003
wars against Iraq provide a perfect illustration of this point. In both cases, the deploy-
ment of hundreds of thousands of US and non-US troops took many months. What
was crucial to that deployment was the pre-existing logistical infrastructure that
allowed these military build-ups to occur.
Therefore, in any discussion of power projection the issue of forward presence is far
less important than the existence and maintenance of a global logistical system that
can facilitate a military build-up in the event of conflict. It follows that for any
attempt to gauge US commitment to European security, the presence of forward
deployed forces is not a useful indicator. Instead, a more relevant indicator will be
whether or not the US has plans to dismantle its logistical infrastructure in Europe,
and there is no sign this is the case, not for the least of reasons that this infrastructure
serves a dual purpose. Not only does it allow American forces to be brought into
Europe, but it is also an essential part of a global logistics system that facilitates
military deployments to the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.
The Obama Administration’s response to the Ukraine crisis, which some commenta-
tors have viewed as being lacklustre, have attributed this, at least in part, to the
‘rebalancing’. Such a view is misleading. According to this logic, one could have
attributed a similar lacklustre response by the Bush Administration to Russia’s
actions in the 2008 Georgia conflict. In both cases, the lacklustre response is linked
to the US being distracted by other priorities – in today’s context the priority is Asia,
in 2008 it was Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst there is some merit to this view, it fails to
take account of a more fundamental problem, and one that has its roots during the
Cold War. The US has consistently been unwilling to confront the Soviet (now
Russian) military with its nuclear arsenal in crises located in what is effectively
perceived as Moscow’s sphere of influence, or those areas where it would have a
high likelihood of fighting back.
In official policy declarations, the US does not subscribe to the concept of a sphere
of influence, but in practice it always has. During the Cold War, the states that
comprised the Warsaw Pact were considered off-limits for US military action, despite
such crises as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In each of these cases,
the US chose not to risk a military intervention for the simple reason that there has
never been sufficient political appetite in Washington to risk an escalation to a great
power or nuclear war for a peripheral interest, whereas in each of these crises
Moscow believed that its core interests were at stake and would have fought back.
Instead, the US restricted its actions to political and diplomatic efforts, as well as
covert action, but refrained from military intervention, and it should come as little
surprise that this was the favoured approach taken during the Georgia and Ukraine
crises. Should a similar crisis emerge in some other non-NATO former Soviet state,
even at a time when the US had no other significant military commitments, it is still
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highly unlikely, if not unthinkable, that US military action would be seriously contem-
plated.
For most of NATO’s European members, concern about the Ukraine crisis and the US
‘rebalancing’ has more to do with a general trepidation about the credibility of
Article V commitments, especially in relation to the Baltic States. This trepidation is
certainly not new, though it has been exacerbated recently. Throughout the Cold
War, there was considerable concern in Western European capitals that if the US was
at serious risk of its own destruction then it would be unwilling to come to their aid
in the event of a Soviet attack. Regardless of US efforts to reassure its allies, the
question remained a live one precisely because no one could be sure of the answer.
One sees traces of these longstanding concerns today with respect to the Baltic
States. These days, the question often asked is: in the event a more assertive Russia
attacked at least one of the Baltic States, would the US (and NATO more broadly),
adhere to its Article V commitments and come to their aid? Once again, the answer
is not certain, but at least two reasonable assumptions can be made. First, the
prospect of a US/NATO response would be more likely if there was an expectation of
the conflict remaining conventional and limited to the immediate zone where it was
being waged, rather than expand further afield or to escalate to the nuclear level.
Second, the prospect of a US/NATO response would be more likely in the case of the
Baltic States than with some other non-NATO member in the region.
This latter assumption is predicated on the belief that the existence of a Treaty
commitment would oblige NATO countries to come to the military aid of one of its
members, a belief that itself is predicated on the further assumption that a Treaty
commitment actually holds considerable value and meaning for the decision-makers
of NATO members. Beyond the Treaty commitment, which in some respects can be
regarded as a political tripwire, is the existence of a military tripwire. During the Cold
War, the US military presence in Europe was regarded as a key tripwire that, if
attacked by the Soviets as part of a broader attack on NATO, would automatically
commit Washington to a defence of Western Europe. These political and military
tripwires were supposed to work in tandem, one supporting the other, to act as a
sufficient deterrent forestalling any Soviet adventurism. A similar combination has
also been in place in South Korea to deter North Korea. However, with the admission
of the Baltic States, combined with NATO’s unwillingness to augment the conven-
tional defence of those countries, the traditional military tripwire is no longer a
significant factor. Instead, the political tripwire has been deemed a sufficient deter-
rent in its own right, even if it only provides marginal reassurance in those countries
bordering Russia. At the very least, a political tripwire provides a greater degree of
ambiguity for a potential aggressor than not having one. One noteworthy feature of
America’s relationships with most Asian countries is that no such comparable polit-
ical and military tripwires exist, nor are they likely to. Very few Asian countries want
US bases in their countries, and even joint military exercises and port visits can be
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highly controversial. Nor has the rise of China elicited any effort to form a new collec-
tive defence organization similar to what SEATO once provided.
In the absence of political and military tripwires, US intervention might also be predi-
cated on an economic tripwire. To the extent that the US economy would be
seriously undermined by an attack on one of its friends, this might also trigger inter-
vention. One case of an economic tripwire that is often cited is the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, with US fear of Saddam Hussein threatening Middle East oil supplies being the
key reason for intervention. Of course, this view of US motives is just one of many,
and there have been many threats to the US economy that did not trigger a military
intervention. Needless to say, a key limitation of the economic tripwire is that rarely
is it the case that the economic threat to one’s own country outweighs the economic
cost of intervention. As will be discussed in the next section, when contemplating
various military scenarios that would involve a confrontation with China, it is hard to
conceive of any conflict with Beijing in which the economic costs of intervention did
not far outweigh the costs of non-intervention.
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LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
IN ASIA
The US military plays many roles in Asia and will continue to do so irrespective of the
‘rebalancing’. These roles include: facilitating logistical support for deployed forces,
conducting maritime security operations, collecting intelligence, engaging in defence
diplomacy, and so on. Perhaps the most significant role it is supposed to play is
reassuring allies and dissuading potential aggressors. It is the credibility of this deter-
rent role that the rise of China has increasingly called into question. In many respects,
the underlying purpose of the ‘rebalancing’ is to demonstrate that Washington
remains committed to maintaining the credibility of its deterrent. As will be
discussed, the military aspects of the ‘rebalancing’ are too insignificant to add much
value to this role. Additionally, those military forces that are based in Asia are more
likely to be employed in a combat role outside the region than within it.
One of the great contradictions of American policy towards China is that it sees it as
both friend and foe simultaneously, though to a great extent this has to do with the
competing cultures and priorities of different institutions within the US Government,
rather than simply reflecting schizophrenia. On an economic level, China is an
enormous powerhouse, and one whose health must be maintained for the sake of
the global economy. From this perspective, it is in America’s national interest to co-
operate with China and not provoke it unnecessarily. That China also holds a great
deal of US debt ensures that both countries’ economies are that much more interde-
pendent. Therefore, from an economic perspective any conflict between the US and
China would be an economic equivalent of mutually assured destruction and cannot
be allowed to happen.
A quite different response towards China’s rise is advocated by the US security
community. Much of the discussion about a US-China confrontation revolves around
two groups within this community. The first group consists of those individuals and
organizations that have a direct stake in promoting the idea that such a confronta-
tion is possible, if not inevitable, and argue that preparations need to be made to
deal with it. In the first instance, this entails developing and maintaining weapons
systems that are more technologically advanced and numerous than the nearest
peer competitor or set of competitors. It is from this group that references are often
made to the technical attributes of Chinese air and naval systems relative to their US
counterparts. They also insist on developing military plans and scenarios in which the
Chinese adversary is predetermined and recognized, if not actually named. The
second group consists of those individuals who view international relations through
a geopolitical prism of competing great powers. In this mind-set, it is only natural for
emerging powers to expand, for other great powers to oppose this expansion, and
for weaker powers caught in the middle to either balance or bandwagon.
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The key shortcoming of this confrontational outlook is that it is rarely appreciated
that great power confrontation need not be of a military nature and result in an
actual war, particularly when both powers possess nuclear arsenals, strong conven-
tional armed forces, and more recently, impressive cyber capabilities. As during the
Cold War, confrontation occurred across many non-military fields and on many
continents. However, the discourse within the US security community on ‘rivalry’
with China omits key issues such as politics, ideology and economics, in favour of a
near-exclusive focus on the military balance. In fact, it is precisely because of these
and many other non-military issues that any US-China confrontation would almost
certainly be confined to the political and economic realm. To the extent military
power plays any useful role, it is in the nature of maintaining forces purely to deter a
direct attack.
In this regard, a discussion of intervention triggers is particularly important for
assessing the utility, and perceived utility, of the current and projected US military
role in Asia. There are three types of conflict in the region that could theoretically
provoke US military intervention. The first is a war between North Korea and South
Korea. The second is a war involving China and one of its neighbours. The third is a
war that doesn’t involve China, such as a war between two other nations, or an
internal conflict in a single nation. Of the three types, intervention in a conflict on the
Korean peninsula is almost certainly more likely relative to the others given
Washington’s longstanding political and military commitments to South Korea.
However, of the other two types, one is hard pressed to determine which is less
likely.
It is difficult to conceptualize a conflict between the US and China that did not
develop in reaction to a conflict over a third country. In other words, the idea that
the US and China would come to military blows over a purely bilateral dispute, such
as over a trade issue, is pretty much unthinkable. The best-known scenarios involve
a US confrontation with China that derives from a dispute between China and one of
its neighbours, particularly Japan or Taiwan. Yet even in these two cases, which are
highly unlikely for all sorts of reasons, it is far from certain that US military forces
would need to be directly involved. Both Japan and Taiwan have significant military
capabilities of their own, and might not even require direct US military intervention.
For instance, were the Chinese to attempt a military invasion of Taiwan they would
need to conduct an amphibious assault to subdue a defending force of hundreds of
thousands that could expand rapidly with a mobilization of reserves. As the massing
of a large amphibious armada cannot be kept hidden, a mobilization of reserves
would be a certainty. To overcome such a strong defence would require an amphib-
ious force several times larger than the largest ever employed in the history of
warfare. Not even the most extreme projections of Chinese military power bring
them anywhere remotely near having the sort of force that would be required. As for
a naval contest between China and Japan, Beijing would be taking a significant risk
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pitting its relatively inexperienced naval forces against Tokyo’s much more formi-
dable naval power. For Japan to prevail in such a contest, it is not immediately
apparent that an overt intervention by US naval power would be required.
Ultimately, it does not really matter which of its neighbours China might potentially
come into conflict with. US intervention in any of these cases would be predicated on
selling this intervention in terms of containing an expansionist power. This would be
a very hard sell indeed to a population that does not identify China’s move as consti-
tuting a clear and present danger, particularly if the conflict was recognized as an
isolated case arising from unique circumstances or an accident rather than as part of
a grand plan of regional conquest. There are also other important mitigating factors
that would limit any US military intervention. For instance, an even less likely
scenario involving US intervention is one in which a conflict erupts between China
and Vietnam or China and Burma, if for no other reason than the prospect of risking
American lives to defend the regimes in Hanoi or Rangoon would hold little appeal
for the American public. It is also difficult to conceive what role the US military could
possibly play in a conflict between China and Russia, China and India, China and
Mongolia, China and Laos, and so forth.
The third type of intervention trigger is a war between two Asian nations that does
not involve China, or an internal conflict within an Asian country. Similar to a US-
China military confrontation, it is difficult to conceptualize a scenario in which
American forces would become significantly involved. The most likely state-on-state
conflict would be a war between India and Pakistan, and were a war to break out
between these two countries, the US would avoid military intervention, just as it has
avoided intervention during previous India-Pakistan conflicts. Instead, it would limit
its actions to diplomacy. Other state-on-state scenarios one could devise would
suffer from the problem of how the US could justify involving itself militarily. As for
internal conflict, unlike in the Vietnam war, in which the US committed forces to the
defence of South Vietnam as part of what it perceived at the time as a larger war
against the expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia, and specifically the fear of
Chinese expansionism, no similar ideological conflict exists today. The only ideolog-
ical concern of the United States for the foreseeable future is the spread of radical
Islam. Even leaving aside the improbability of a strong Islamist insurgency threat-
ening the overthrow of an Asian country, the US would not send any significant
military forces to assist that government. Traditional US practice, both in the Cold
War to combat ‘Communist subversive insurgency’, and after 9/11 to ‘counter
terrorism’, has been to send small numbers of advisors and Special Forces, provide
military and non-military aid, and in the present era, to launch the occasional drone
strike. The three large-scale interventions – Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan – were
exceptions to the small-scale rule.
Therefore, in terms of the three possible triggers for future US military intervention
in Asian conflicts, there is likely to be more continuity than change, and it is doubtful
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that any addition of US military forces to the region will serve a significant practical
military purpose. As for serving a political purpose, the prospect for additional
military deployments to have a positive psychological impact on reassuring allies and
dissuading Chinese adventurism will be largely dependent on how the move is inter-
preted in the region itself, and what actions are taken in response to it. For example,
if China feels threatened, or sees a need to demonstrate its own ability to escalate
for face-saving reasons, the US move may accelerate an arms race that is already
underway in the region. Admittedly, China will continue to bolster its armed forces
regardless of any new military deployments made by the US, with other countries in
the region also increasing their military capabilities in response to China’s actions.
In terms of reassuring allies, it is notable that the Asia ‘rebalancing’ was a unilateral
initiative both in its conception and in the timing of its announcement. There is little
evidence that other countries in the region were consulted in advance. To the
contrary, as with many US foreign policy initiatives such as this, the region itself is
merely expected to fit into a scheme that is devised in Washington DC. That these
countries may hold other ideas and may choose to resist the US efforts is not a likeli-
hood that seems to have been given much thought, not for the least of reasons that
it would have dampened enthusiasm for the policy. Nor do American policymakers
ever consider that just because the US Government suddenly chooses to focus on a
particular region or issue that it had previously shown less interest in, that local
governments will see matters in quite the same way or with the same sense of
urgency. Furthermore, it is doubtful that even those countries that welcome a
stronger American presence in the region to balance China will be reassured in the
absence of the sort of political, military, and economic tripwires referred to earlier.
For the US, the absence of these tripwires raises the problem of how to reassure its
friends in the region that the US would come to their aid militarily if it had to. Beyond
mere rhetorical reassurances, a key means of demonstrating commitment is to
engage in serious bilateral defence planning in which military experts from both
countries discuss how they would work together in the event of a conflict erupting,
what the military requirements would likely consist of, and what practical measures
could be taken in advance to facilitate cooperation. When undertaking this sort of
planning it is essential that the plans are plausible and that any subsequent military
cooperation derives from those plans. Unfortunately, much of the current American
thinking about a conflict with China suffers from serious conceptual limitations. In
addition, the military measures undertaken as part of the ‘rebalancing’ do not seem
to bear any relation to how the US would respond in a crisis, thereby limiting their
utility as a means of reassurance.
To the extent the matter of a US military response to potential Chinese aggression is
thought about at all, as well as being planned for, this is principally limited to two
main scenarios. The preferred response is the type in which the US holds a strong
advantage, namely a discrete naval clash that does not include attacks on the
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Chinese mainland. Despite a growing concern about the prospect of a Chinese ‘blue
water’ fleet centred around its two carriers, there is actually little risk of such a clash
occurring. Beijing is well aware of the near certainty that in purely operational terms
such a clash would result in a catastrophic defeat for the Chinese Navy. One of the
problems resulting from the hype about the potential threat posed by Chinese
carriers, which at a technical level are far less sophisticated and carry fewer aircraft
than a US carrier, nor do they have adequate logistical support, is that US planners
automatically assume that Chinese leaders would be willing to risk their most prized
naval assets against a much larger and advanced US fleet. Whereas US planners
might emphasize only those US assets that could be brought to bear within the first
days and weeks of a conflict, Chinese planners have to assume that they would
confront the bulk of US naval assets over a much longer period. As such, the Chinese
would have to calculate the US could deploy all of its carrier assets, rather than the
one or two it might have on hand at any given moment. In actual fact, the Chinese
would no doubt be wary of risking these naval assets against the Taiwanese or
Japanese navies, much less the US Navy. ‘Anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ are not
military concepts that belong exclusively to China. Chinese vessels can just as easily
be excluded from encroaching elsewhere in the region as they can try to limit others
from encroaching on their own preserve. It is worth remembering that were the
Chinese Navy to be humiliated by a ‘lesser’ power, this would be considerably more
embarrassing than being humiliated by the US.
The second major scenario of a US-China military confrontation would involve any
conflict at a level above a discrete naval clash. This type of scenario is impossible to
seriously prepare for, if for no other reason than even if one assumes there would be
no nuclear weapons involved, it would still be on a size, scale and duration far
exceeding anything defence planners are currently contemplating. Indeed, for such
a scenario to unfold, planners would have to ‘think the unthinkable’ about the polit-
ical goals involved, war duration, mobilization potential, the role of space and cyber
weapons, how US and Chinese leaders’ attitudes towards political and economic risk
would radically change, how such a conflict could be resolved, and so on. In short,
there are so many variables to consider that no serious defence planning can occur.
Incidentally, many of these same variables also apply in the case of a limited naval
clash. However, such has been the focus on the purely military aspects of this
scenario in the US defence discourse, such as on Air-Sea Battle and how to keep
ahead of the Chinese technologically, that the wider context of how a conflict would
develop has been completely ignored. For example, there is little discussion about
the limits that would almost certainly be placed on any US military action against the
Chinese mainland. Similarly, there is no discussion about how the US could prosecute
a conflict in such a way that the damage to the global economy could be minimized,
or how a conflict would end so that a return to a peaceful status quo and resumption
of trade relations would follow.
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In any non-nuclear conflict between the US and China, the most important consider-
ation for American policymakers would be to see that it was fought in such a way that
it did not seriously interfere with trade, or escalate to the waging of economic
warfare. As fighting a war in this manner would be highly implausible, this would act
as an important constraint on conflict erupting to begin with. Just as US policymakers
during the Cold War were extremely wary of a conflict escalation with the Soviets
that would cross the nuclear threshold, policymakers today are similarly concerned
about a conflict with China crossing the economic threshold. Though most discussion
of a US-China confrontation is principally concerned with military responses to
Chinese action, the US would much more likely use non-military means to bring
pressure to bear on Beijing. That the US would engage in combat as a first resort to
counter Chinese aggression seems a highly unlikely response, especially if the stakes
in the conflict were quite small. If the US is unwilling to use military force to defend
Ukraine, it seems improbable that they would risk a major conflict with China in
response to a seizure of disputed islands. More realistically, the US would employ
non-military pressure as a first resort.
Though it is possible to devise any number of scenarios in which some sort of conflict
might erupt between the US and China, for these scenarios to have any plausibility
requires that some attempt is made to consider what factors would shape how such
a conflict would be waged. For instance, there is little reason why the US Navy would
even need to take the risk of putting its ships in harm’s way close to China’s
immediate vicinity as a first response. A more effective means of putting pressure on
the Chinese leadership might be to enforce a naval blockade to prevent Middle East
energy supplies and other commercial vessels from reaching China, though even this
option presupposes the US would be willing to contend with the economic conse-
quences this action would likely precipitate. As argued here, the military-technical
aspects of these scenarios are of at least secondary importance compared with the
non-military aspects. If there is one point that is generally agreed, it is that for such
a conflict to begin, the leaders of at least one side would have to seriously miscalcu-
late or be completely irrational. Of course, leaders miscalculating or acting irration-
ally are a constant of history and small conflicts can easily get out of hand. Therefore,
one cannot automatically rule out conflict. What can be ruled out is a ‘rational’
conflict of the sort that presently serves as the basis for all US military thinking on the
issue.
As even this limited discussion highlights, a focus on the military aspects of the Asia
‘rebalancing’ does not serve as a useful basis for any serious contemplation about
how the US would deter, or if necessary wage, a conflict with China. Nevertheless, a
number of general conclusions can be reached that can assist how analysts concep-
tualize the problem, both in its own right, as well as in relation to the implications for
US military operations elsewhere. Looking ahead, the US will continue to speak
about the perceived need to develop military capabilities to deter, or possibly defeat,
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the Chinese. However, underpinning most of these discussions will be motives other
than the stated ones, such as reassuring allies, and promoting certain weapons
programmes and bureaucratic interests. If this subtext is taken into account, then the
implications of the ‘rebalancing’ for Europe, and in the region itself, can be recog-
nized as being much less significant than would otherwise be assumed.
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THE DECLINING UTILITY OF AMERICAN POWER 
PROJECTION
A regrettable outcome of the undue discursive emphasis on the Asia ‘rebalancing’
has been to detract attention from more meaningful developments in Washington’s
willingness and ability to effectively project military power. The experience of the US
military in recent years provides many clues about their strengths and weaknesses,
and perhaps more importantly, about the political leadership that decides when and
how to employ them. When attempting to determine the likelihood of future
American military interventions it is these clues that provide a much more reliable
guide than the rhetoric of US leaders.
In the absence of a conflict with China, which as noted in the previous section is very
unlikely indeed, for the foreseeable future the US military will continue to be preoc-
cupied with lesser conflicts (i.e. conflicts other than great power war), of which there
are no imminent shortage. Given the prevalence of the ‘use it or lose it mentality’, it
is hard to justify large defence expenditures for a military that has no role play. Also,
US policymakers do not like to be seen doing nothing to deal with international crises
as this would make the ‘superpower’ appear to be a ‘helpless giant’ in the eyes of
both foreigners and its own population. This being the case, the US military will be
quite keen to remain active on the world stage in one form or another, and will argue
it needs to be prepared to deal with the ‘full spectrum’ of conflict.
Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the maximum sustainable level of US military
power was deployed for an extended period, in the years ahead there will be
increasing limits to the amount of power that can be projected. In the aftermath of
the withdrawal of large-scale combat forces from these two countries amidst little or
no success in building sustainable states in effective control of their territories, a
‘syndrome’ similar to the one that occurred after Vietnam has made deployments of
a similar scale in the future an extremely hazardous prospect politically. In addition,
the sheer cost of these deployments and their adverse impact on the US economy
has placed further constraints on the ability and willingness of politicians to under-
take them. From a military doctrine perspective, the idea that the US military could
stabilize countries beset with insurgencies was completely undermined by the Iraq
and Afghan wars, and the earlier enthusiasm for mainstream counterinsurgency
doctrine has now vanished. Of key concern is that US political and military leaders
have not attempted to understand the reasons for the failures in Iraq and Afghani-
stan and look for new ideas about how to deal with similar challenges in the future.
Instead, they have merely been content to claim a degree of partial success, quickly
forget the matter, and then move on to the next crisis without making any major
reforms.
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In this sense, the US political and military system is suffering from an intellectual and
identity crisis, overloaded with an unending series of complicated crises, trying to be
everywhere at once, whilst the military tools it has at its disposal are of decreasing
utility in managing, much less solving them. Though ostensibly reluctant about
authorizing military interventions, President Obama has nonetheless done so, or
considered doing so, albeit consistently in a half-hearted manner, and with little or
no prospect that such interventions could resolve any of the underlying problems
that were causing the conflict in the first place. In 2009, he supported two separate
‘surges’ of American forces to Afghanistan, but reportedly spent considerable time
haggling over the precise numbers to be sent and the duration of their deployment,
rather than focusing on the more fundamental policy problem of what these extra
troops could realistically be expected to achieve. In 2011, Obama supported military
action against Libya, but then chose to ‘lead from behind’. In 2013, US military power
was almost used against Syria, but then this option was effectively ruled out in favour
of diplomacy. In 2014, the US military response to the Ukraine crisis did not deter
Russian actions and provided little reassurance to European allies. Also in 2014, US
actions in response to the Islamic State’s conquest of large parts of Iraq and Syria
failed to facilitate any significant successes against it.
Whilst many commentators have blamed Obama for taking fatal half-measures, and
though there may be a great deal of merit in this criticism, it must also be recognized
that there are important limitations to US power, and that full-measures would most
likely have been just as unsuccessful. In Afghanistan, sending more US troops would
probably have deepened the quagmire, rather than actually produced any sustain-
able successes. The fundamental political, administrative and economic weaknesses
of the Afghan state were not problems that could have been solved with more US
forces, at least not without creating additional problems. In Libya, additional US
airpower might have shortened the war by a few months, but even in this case,
airpower played a supporting role, whereas the key fighting that led to the fall of
Tripoli occurred on the ground. In response to Syria’s alleged use of WMD against
rebel forces, thus crossing Obama’s ‘red line’, no military action was taken, but to be
fair, the military options available carried more risks of escalating that crisis rather
than de-escalating it. Furthermore, the Obama Administration’s policy towards Syria
more generally could be characterized as schizophrenic in that it needs the coopera-
tion of the Assad regime to fight the Islamic State and ensure the continued destruc-
tion of Syria’s WMD, but at the same time Washington has a stated policy of trying
to overthrow the regime, and is working with rebel forces, albeit again somewhat
half-heartedly, to do so. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it is hard to
conceptualize any military actions taken by the US that could have reversed the
situation. Dispatching US forces to Ukraine would almost certainly have provoked a
direct military confrontation with Russia. Nor could any US actions reverse the struc-
tural weaknesses of the Ukrainian state. At best, the dispatch of larger numbers of
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military personnel and aircraft to Poland and the Baltic states might have provided
greater reassurance to its NATO allies, but this would not have addressed the funda-
mental problem in Ukraine itself.
Of all the present crises, the problem of countering the Islamic State is the most
complicated, as well as the most important for the US given the threat to its regional
interests, especially if the problem cannot be contained. It is a problem that will not
be solved anytime soon, and at best, will only be managed over many years.
Although the potential terrorism threat to the US homeland posed by the Islamic
State remains unclear, the American worst-case popular perception of that threat
will ensure US leaders are forced to remain focused on this issue. Consequently, US
interest in the region is unlikely to wane, and it will almost certainly have a higher
priority in terms of the political attention and resources devoted to it than might
otherwise be devoted to Asia. This conflict is also one that is likely to further under-
mine confidence in what the tools of US power can achieve.
To date, and in the absence of an imminent threat to the city of Baghdad, US leaders
have avoided large military commitments, if for no other reason than they are unsure
whether additional military actions would improve the security situation or worsen
it. No doubt Iraqi leaders are also quite reluctant to request US ground forces and
wish to keep any American intervention as limited as possible. Nevertheless, there is
only so much the US air campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria can
achieve. It may have the effect of slowing down or stopping the Islamic State at a
tactical level, and possibly of reassuring US allies, but ultimately ground forces are
required to hold the present line, to retake lost territory, and then to ‘stabilize’ it
over the longer term.
When contemplating a larger intervention in Iraq, and possibly Syria, US decision-
makers must try to answer a number of difficult questions. Should US ground forces
be sent? If so, how many and what would their mission be? Would they be limited to
Iraq, or would they be given authority to cross into Syria and to capture territory
there as well? For how long after they have captured the territory from the Islamic
State would they need to occupy it before the Iraqi government could take control?
And if the Islamic State forces chose to go underground and wage a long-term
guerrilla war, how many more troops might be needed, and for how long? It is
precisely this degree of complexity, combined with the probable risk of creating
another quagmire that hinders the formation of a clear and consistent policy. As with
any issue in which all the options for taking action are certain to result in some
degree of loss, having to determine which is the least bad option can cause paralysis,
since taking no decision may be seen as preferable.
Were the US to send ground troops to Iraq, and then keep them there indefinitely,
this would undermine any possibility Washington could focus on Asia. On the other
hand, not sending ground troops will also leave the Islamic State as a simmering
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problem with the potential to boil over. Having captured so much territory so quickly,
a race is now underway between the Islamic State and the Iraqi government. The
Islamic State must consolidate its gains and continue to expand or risk withering
away, whereas the Iraqi state must rebuild its shattered military capabilities or face
a total collapse. Needless to say, as much as Iraq is now receiving more attention, the
problem of Afghanistan has not entirely receded either. With the recent signing of
the Bilateral Security Agreement, significant US military forces will remain in Afghan-
istan for several more years at the very least. In many respects, the prospects for
Afghanistan after 2015 will be gloomier than the prospects in Iraq after the US
military completed its withdrawal in 2011. As the Taliban and other anti-government
groups take advantage of the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of most
foreign troops, the situation is likely to worsen considerably, so much so that in the
next few years, if not sooner, the US Government might have to contemplate
returning in force to defend Kabul, just as it is presently contemplating defending
Baghdad. This too will have negative implications for the Asia ‘rebalancing’. Apart
from the political embarrassment a Taliban victory would cause, as well as poten-
tially requiring a large-scale return of US combat troops to reverse the situation, it
would also reflect poorly on American power more generally.
If there is one central observation to make about the influence of American power
after 9/11, and its prospects for the future, it is that the tools the US has at its
disposal are increasingly perceived as being dysfunctional and irrelevant. The failure
of these tools in Iraq and Afghanistan are merely the tip of the iceberg. In the after-
math of Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, Libya plunged into chaos, with the US and European
powers refusing to seriously contemplate military action to ‘stabilize’ the situation
on the grounds that such action would be too costly and have little chance of success.
When the Middle East was rocked by the Arab Spring, the US was largely forced to sit
on the side-lines as the Mubarak regime in Egypt, its key ally in the region, was
overthrown. In the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall, the US played a much less substan-
tive role than Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in promoting a counter-
revolution given that its financial aid to Egypt was only a fraction of that compared
to these regional players. Both these countries found it more advantageous to take
matters into their own hands instead of deferring to a US lead. Yet Egypt is not an
isolated case of regional powers playing an increasingly assertive role to compensate
for what they perceive to be American weakness. Countless other recent instances
can be found in which neither US ‘hard’, ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ power has played any
meaningful role in resolving regional conflicts or reassuring longstanding allies.
Despite this reality, the prevailing culture among the US ‘national security managers’
remains one that stresses the importance of acting globally and strategically, but
rarely are the limits of American power appreciated. Policymakers may be forced to
accept these limits as a matter of day-to-day practice, but the ideology of the all-
powerful superpower remains dominant. It is a culture that lives and breathes in an
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atmosphere of daily international crises, in which it is always assumed the US has
some role to play. In part, this global outlook simply reflects the global presence and
outlook of the bureaucracy and the global nature of American interests. For instance,
within both the State Department and Defense Department there are numerous sub-
bureaucracies responsible for developing and instituting policies covering every
region of the world, and these sub-bureaucracies are in constant competition for
attention and influence. Unlike the foreign services and military systems of other
great powers, the US is the only one with sufficient resources to maintain a signifi-
cant diplomatic and military presence in all regions of the world rather than being
limited to one or two regions. Therefore, in contrast to the French Government
which might prioritize its former colonial empire, or the Chinese who focus mainly on
Asia, the US bureaucracy is constantly dealing with crises everywhere. Apart from
internal bureaucratic drivers, the media and domestic and international lobbying
groups also play a crucial role in generating high-level attention on particular issues.
For US leaders, there are no objective criteria for what constitutes a ‘crisis’. An issue
is recognized as a ‘crisis’ merely because it has percolated to the top of policymakers’
agendas, though the reasons for this are typically random and unpredictable. The
problem for US leaders is that there are only so many hours in the day, and only so
many crises that can be handled simultaneously. Therefore only a small selection of
issues will be considered as crises. In many respects crises resemble the front page
of a newspaper. Just as editors must select a small percentage of the news to put on
the front page every day of the week, so too must an unending stream of crises be
provided to policymakers. The effect this has on the US policymaking system is to
ensure that it is perpetually reacting to events, and therefore constantly at risk of
being distracted and overcommitted to dealing with relatively minor problems whilst
unable to concentrate on more important issues when they arise.
The American penchant for playing a role in so many armed conflicts around the
world often reflects a ‘can-do’ mentality, an extremely broad definition of what
constitutes US national security, and a somewhat uncritical belief in the altruism of
American power. Also, largely for domestic political reasons, American leaders are
inclined to commit themselves to conflicts without thinking through the policy ends
beforehand and whether or not they are achievable with the means allocated to
them. Achievable political ends, which are a prerequisite for developing an achiev-
able strategy, have been particularly notable by their absence in recent conflicts. The
US political culture has become so partisan that American leaders are now more
prompted to take military action regardless of whether or not this is sensible, rather
than face accusations of inaction and appearing weak.
All of this is not to say that the system is completely unrestrained and that US presi-
dents will always approve the use of military force. American leaders may consist-
ently display a ‘superpower mentality’, and appear loathe to accept limitations to
their power, yet they still do. The list of significant conflicts where the US has not
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played a role is a long one. There are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost,
US leaders are constrained by money. They may have access to enormous sums of
funding but it is not an unlimited amount and therefore tough choices need to be
made. On occasion, local countries will reject what they see as US interference and
deny Washington any practical means of becoming meaningfully involved. In many
cases, US attention and military resources are spread too thin, and cannot be every-
where at once. In other cases, the scale of the problem and the risks of involvement
are simply too great. Sometimes another power or international organization, such
as the UN or EU, will take the lead. Also, there may be no public support for taking
military action, especially if there is no threat – real, imagined or exaggerated – that
can justify the costs involved. Regrettably too much analytical attention has been
placed on those US interventions that have occurred, whereas too little interest has
been shown in the reasons why the US does not intervene. This is probably inevi-
table, as the dog that barks will always attract more attention than the dog that
remains silent. An important consequence of this lack of interest has been that the
reasons for US inaction are often misconstrued and the wrong conclusions are drawn
about the actual strengths and weaknesses of American power.
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CONCLUSION
Understanding the ad hoc nature of US military action and inaction is important if for
no other reason than it undermines the notion that American policy can be assessed
and predicted on the basis of publicly declared strategic priorities and foreign policy
doctrine. Unfortunately, a focus on official rhetoric to the exclusion of substance and
context is a poor guide to analysing policy. As with any government policy, it must be
recognized that there are usually structural factors that place limits on policy imple-
mentation, and when analysing official rhetoric it is crucial to account for subtext.
Even a superficial examination of the history of US foreign policy would immediately
reveal a wide gap between rhetoric and action. That US political rhetoric should still
be accepted at face value, thereby ignoring this exhausting history, is perhaps the
most astonishing reality of all.
The very real but unspoken predicament the US armed forces find themselves in
today is that they are overcommitted and quite limited in what they can realistically
be expected to achieve. In this, the US is hardly alone, and many of the limits associ-
ated with the ‘utility of force’ that have been identified in this paper can just as easily
be applied to other armed forces as well. Arguably the most significant ‘transforma-
tion’ in US defence policy that occurred after 9/11 was a radical shift in the willing-
ness of US policymakers to undertake high-risk and costly military interventions of
the sort that would have been unthinkable during the Clinton Administration. When
comparing the US defence debate in that earlier decade with that of today, especially
in relation to many of the same types of security challenges that are still referred to
as new, it is quite apparent that interventions that would previously have been
rejected as a matter of course, and for very good reasons, are now accepted as
normal, with little debate at all. The recent track record of the US military resolving
international disputes and defeating insurgencies is pretty poor, and their ability to
do so in the future does not look set to improve. Even those politicians and generals
with a strong grounding in history and military theory who ought to know better
about the limits of such interventions proceed with them regardless. Not even the
rise of isolationist tendencies among the US public in recent years has led to any
reduction in the number of foreign military activities, though it does seem to have
been partially responsible, along with fiscal constraints, for scaling-down the size of
those activities.
In the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, the Asia ‘rebalancing’ is likely to
recede into the background of American political discourse. On the topic of foreign
policy, two issues will probably dominate Republican criticism of the Democrats: the
‘loss’ of Iraq and the ‘loss’ of Ukraine. Any number of other crises may occur during
this period as well, such as a major defeat for the Afghan government, and this will
cause Asia to recede that much further into the background. But short of China taking
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any large-scale aggressive military action against one of its neighbours, or a North
Korean attack on South Korea, there is unlikely to be much debate or serious thinking
about the US military role in Asia during this period. As Republicans criticize
Democrats over their handling of the Ukraine crisis there will be more attention paid
to the problem of how the US deals with the ‘Russia threat’. Since both parties will
wish to appear tough on this issue, there will almost certainly be numerous calls for
reversing the American military ‘decline’ in Europe and reinvigorating NATO. It is
virtually unthinkable that there will be any appetite for arguing that the US needs to
devote fewer resources to Europe. Thus, when the next president takes office,
countering the ‘Russia threat’ will probably be just as high, if not higher, on his/her
defence policy agenda than the ‘China threat’. By default, European security and the
future US role in NATO will be high on this agenda as well.
As this paper has argued, it may be the case that the US takes less interest in
European security, loosely defined, but this is not for the reasons commonly given,
and it most certainly has little to do with the Asia ‘rebalancing’. At the end of the day,
the US remains a global actor with global interests and therefore thinks in global
rather than regional terms. Since the Second World War, the US has maintained
diplomatic, military, and intelligence bureaucracies that have been continually
present and engaged in activities around the world. Slight shifts in regional priorities
were a notable feature of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, but it must be
stressed that these shifts were relatively minor when the global whole is taken into
consideration. To the extent the US becomes embroiled in conflicts, this has more to
do with a concatenation of factors, such as the nature of the stakes involved, the
degree of domestic political pressure being applied at the time, how many other
crises are ongoing simultaneously, and the perceived ability of the US military to
actually achieve the goals it has been set by the politicians at an acceptable cost.
Analysts and political leaders who make predictions about US policy but fail to recog-
nize the centrality of the ‘crisis du jour’, the attention deficit disorder that character-
izes American policymaking, and the structural limits to strategic action, will likely
continue to act on the basis of misperception. In this sense, if America’s global
defence predicament can be better understood, the sort of highly questionable
concern expressed in Europe since 2011 about being abandoned by the US in favour
of Asia might be less likely to arise in the future.
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